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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tions of negligence and also used a general allegation, and then
could not make out a prima facie case under the specific allega-
tions ? Could he then invoke the res ipsa doctrine on the general
allegations? This would seem to be the heart of the question,
and it appears that it is undecided in this jurisdiction. In a
doubtful case, the plaintiff cannot, when he draws the com-
plaint, forecast with assurance that the court will find his
case to be one within the doctrine. If he relies on the doctrine
and alleges generally, the court may find the case not to be res
ipsa with the result that he goes out on demurrer. If he alleges
specifically, he may not be able to fall back on the doctrine even
though the court finds it to be a res ipsa case. It would seem,
therefore, that if the court finds the case to be within the doc-
trine, the pleader should be enabled to fall back on res ipsa even
though he has alleged specifically, and especially if he has cou-
pled the specific with a general allegation.'
ROBERT APPELGREN
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON A NON-RESIDENT
VENDOR OF MONTANA LAND
The equity maxim, "aequitas agit in personam," though
shorn of its once pervasive vitality which was fostered by .Ln
attempt to promote rapport with the common law courts,' is still
a living, moving force in the United States in the absence of
statutory modification. However, even from very early times
52Under date of March 15, 1952, the case of Whitney v. Northland Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 7 State Reporter 101 ....... P. (2d) ...... was decided by
the Montana Supreme Court. In this case, the plaintiff, a bus passenger,
sued to recover damage for personal injury due to the overturning of
the bus. Verdict and judgment for the defendant below was reversed.
One notes with satisfacton the majority opinion citing and relying on
cases to the effect that where res ipsa is otherwise applicable, the plain-
tiff does not lose the benefit of the doctrine by alleging specific acts of
negligence which his evidence fails to prove or only tends to prove. It
is not, however, believed that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
in a res ipsa case. The dissenting opinion properly points out that the
burden is on the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence to establish
his case, and if, at the close of the evidence the minds of jurors are in
equipoise, the plaintiff has failed; further, that the doctrine where
applicable furnishes merely a permissible evidential inference which is
not controlling on the jury, and that where the plaintiff elects to try his
case on "evidence of a higher grade and degree" than that of permissi-
ble inferences without request for an instruction on res ipsa, there can
be no reviewable error on which to postulate a reversal.
'1 Pommoy's EQurTY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 134, 135, pp. 183-186 (5th ed.
1941).
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the traditional equity writs of assistance and sequestration' pro-
vided for limited enforcement of equity decrees in rem.
Whether equity, by virtue of its own inherent power, can
act directly on property within its jurisdiction to create, transfer,
or otherwise affect interests therein is a matter of some dispute.
The United States Supreme Court in Hart v. Sansom declared:
"... a court of equity acts in personam by compelling
a deed to be executed or cancelled by, or in behalf of,
the party. It has no inherent power, by the mere force
of its decree, to annul a deed, or to establish a title."'
The Court admitted, however, that legislation could empow-
er a court of equity to act in rem. Where such legislation exists,
the question as to equity's inherent power becomes largely aca-
demic.
'The former was used to place plaintiff in possession of realty; the lat-
ter to put the plaintiff in possession of personalty and also to author-
ize its sale to satisfy a money decree. WALSH, EQUITY §§ 10, 11, 12,
pp. 45-53 (1930).
'Actions in personam and in rem are defined by Mr. Freeman as:
a) A proceeding in rem is one in which "the judgment rendered is an
adjudication against some person or thing, or upon the status of
some subject matter, which wherever and whenever binding upon
any person is equally binding upon all persons."
Whether certain proceedings such as eminent domain, suits to
partition land, to recover taxes, or to foreclose a lien are proceed-
ings in rem depends on the effect the judgment is given by statute
or judicial decision.
b) A proceeding quasi in rem Is one "against a non-resident for the
purpose of determining claims to or enforcing liens upon his prop-
erty within the state, or of applying it to the payment of debts."
Included in this class of actions are foreign attachment proceed-
ings, actions to quiet title, and, inter alia, actions to enforce specifi-
cally a contract for the sale of local land where constructive service
is authorized by 8tatute.
c) A proceeding in personam is one the object of which is to determine
personal rights and liabilities. Typical examples are ordinary tort
and contract actions for damages.
FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS §§ 1517-1522, pp. 3110-3127; § 16, p. 25 (5th ed.
1925).
'110 U.S. 151, 3 S. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101 (1884).
'Contra: Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E. 387 (1910).
Cf. Bowden v. Schatzell, 23 Am. Dec. 170 (1831). The court insisted,
"But our courts do not always act in personam. It seems that they
may act directly on the property, without the intervention of other par-
ties; and the title may be changed by the mere act of the court, with-
out any act of the party." (Italics supplied).
'Bush v. Aldrich, 110 S.C. 491, 96 S.E. 922 (1918).
"It may be conceded that originally specific performance was an action
in personam, as indeed all proceedings in equity were. One of the
maxims of equity is 'aequitas agit in personam.' Suits to foreclose
mortgages, to partition lands, to quiet titles, and to remove clouds on
titles were all originally suits in personam. But in the course of time
-whether the change was brought about by the gradual extension of
their jurisdiction by the courts themselves, or is the result of statutes;
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In 1878 the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Field in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff,' laid down the
proposition that as a matter of due process exacted by the Four-
teenth Amendment, a personal judgment against a non-resident
must be predicated on personal service within the court's jurisdic-
tion. If equity acts only in personam it is clear that an equity
decree against a non-resident must be based on personal service.
And more specifically, personal service would be a prerequisite
to jurisdiction over a non-resident vendor in an action by the
purchaser to enforce specifically a contract for the conveyance
of local land. Assuming for a moment that an action for specific
performance of a land contract might be classified as an action
in rem under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court in the
Pennoyer case condoned substituted service in such an atcion by
saying:
"Such service may also be sufficient in cases where
the object of the action is to reach and dispose of prop-
erty in the state, or of some interest therein, by enforc-
ing a contract or a lien respecting the same. . . . In other
words, such service may answer in all actions which are
substantially proceedings in rem." (Italics supplied).
Traditionally, in the absence of statutory modification, the
action for specific performance of a land contract has been con-
sidered to be in personam, the object of which was to compel
personal action viz., the execution by the defendant of a deed to
the land in question.' The personal nature of the action is more
dramatically illustrated by the rule that a court of equity, hav-
ing jurisdiction over the parties to a land contract, may decree
specific performance though the land is not within the court's
jurisdiction.'
In this country many of the states have changed the action
from one in personam to one in rem by statutes authorizing con-
structive service in actions on land contracts, either specifically
or by implication. With even greater unanimity' statutes have
it is unnecessary now to inquire-such actions have almost universally
come to be regarded as having a twofold aspect; that is, as being part-
ly in personam and partly in rem."
795 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
'Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 13 L. Ed. 164 (1850) ; Bank of
Floral City v. Warnock, 144 Ga. 117, 86 S.E. 249 (1915) ; Fowler v.
Fowler, 204 Ill. 82, 68 N.E. 414 (1903) ; Light v. Doolittle, 77 Ind. App.
187, 133 N.E. 413 (1921) ; Close v. Wheaton, 65 Kan. 830, 70 P. 891
(1902) ; Spurr v. Scoville, 57 Mass. 578 (1849) ; Worthington v. Lee,
61 Md. 530 (1884); Kinkead v. Clark, Tex. Civ. App., 239 S.W. 717
(1922).
Penn. v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1750).
"oSupra, note 1.
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been passed which provide, either that a decree for the convey-
ance of title shall operate "ex proprio vigore" to convey the title,
or that the decree shall be made effective by appointment of an
officer of the court to execute a deed. In either case the title
is conveyed as though the defendant himself had executed the
deed.
As early as 1850' the highest tribunal in the United States
recognized the change which could be wrought by statute and ob-
served:
"A bill for the specific execution of a contract to
convey real estate is not strictly a proceeding in rem in
ordinary cases; but where such a procedure is author-
ized by statute, on publication, without personal service
of process, it is, substantially, of that character."
The constitutional power of the states to provide for ad-
judication of titles to land within their boundaries by a suit in
which a non-resident defendant is brought in by publication was
authoritatively settled in 1890 by the case of Arndt v. Griggs."
In states where statutes provide specifically that service of
process may be made by publication in actions for specific per-
formance of a contract to convey local land against a non-resident
vendor the character of the suit has been declared changed from
one in personam to one in rem." The conflict arises when statutes
merely authorize constructive service in actions against non-
residents generally, specifying no classes of actions, or when the
statute provides for such service in actions concerning realty or
personalty in the state, of which the following is typical :'
"Where the subject of the action is real or personal
property in this state, and the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the re-
lief demanded consists wholly or partly in excluding the
defendant from any interest or lien therein."
By the weight of authority this intermediate type of statute
embraces suits for specific performance, particularly where it
is also provided by statute that the decree shall operate to trans-
fer title "ex proprio vigore," or that an agent of the court shall
'Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, supra, note 8.
'134 U.S. 316, 10 S. Ct. 577, 33 L. Ed. 918 (1890).
'SSingle v. Scott, 55 Fed. 553 (1893); Watters v. Southern Brighton
Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S.E. 87 (1929); Light v. Doolittle, 77 Ind. App.
187, 133 N.E. 413 (1921) ; Horner v. Ellis, 75 Kan. 675, 90 P. 275 (1907) ;
Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co. of the City of Baltimore, 109
Md. 131, 71 A. 447 (1908) ; Safarik v. Greenwald, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
(NS) 219, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 607 (1903).
"North Carolina Code § 484 (1939).
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be appointed to execute a deed.' Indeed, even under statutes of
the general type, when supplemented by legislative authorization
to give a decree operating in rem, the action to enforce specifical-
ly a contract for the conveyance of local land has been held to be
one in rem." In Englander v. Jacoby" the New Jersey court an-
nounced, "Our statute authorizing notice to non-resident defend-
ants by publication and mailing is comprehensive and extends to
all cases where principles of due process do not require actual
service within the state."
At this point an analysis of the Montana cases on the subject
is in order. The first case dealing with the problem is Silver
Camp Mining Co. v. Dickert,. an action against a non-resident to
compel specific performance of a contract to convey Montana
land. Service of process was made by publication under the fol-
lowing statute :'
"When the person on whom service of a summons is
to be made, resides out of the state, or has departed from
the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within
date, or conceals himself to avoid the service of sum-
mons; or when the defendant is a foreign corporation
having no managing or business agent, cashier, secretary
or other officer within the state, and an affidavit stating
any of these facts is filed with the clerk of the court in
which the action is brought, and such affidavit also
states that a cause of action exists against the defendant
in respect to whom the service of the summons is to be
made, and that he or it is a necessary or proper party to
the action, the clerk of the court in which the action is
commenced shall cause the service of the summons to be
made by publication thereof."
Relying on Pennoyer v. Neff" and a fecundity of early state
1Tutt v. Davis, 13 Cal. App. 715, 110 P. 690 (1910) ; Voehringer v. Pol-
lock, 224 N.C. 409, 30 S.E. (2d) .374 (1944) ; Garfein v. Mclnnis, 248
N.Y. 261, 162 N.E. 73 (1928) ; Hawkins v. Doe, 60 Ore. 437, 119 P. 754
(1912) ; Bush v. Aldrich, 110, S.C. 491, 96 S.E. 922 (1918). In the last
case, though there was no statute specifically empowering the court to
render a decree in rem, the court felt that constitutional provisions
merging law and equity and giving the court power to render a judg-
ment which would be the final determination of the rights of the par-
ties, would support such a decree. The court further observed that the
statute, like the one quoted in the text above, conferred such power, "by
necessary implication, because its sole purpose was to subject the prop-
erty to the jurisdiction of the court." Any other interpretation would
deny the statute force and effect.
16McVoy v. Bauman, 93 N.J. 638, 117 A. 725 (1922) ; Clem v. Givens, 106
Va. 145, 55 S.E. 567 (1906) ; State ex reZ. Truitt v. District Court, 44
N.M. 16, 96 P. (2d) 710 (1939) (Dictum).
"132 N.J. Eq. 336, 28 A. (2d) 292 (1942).
1'31 Mont. 488, 78 P. 967 (1904).
"Montana, Code of Civ. Proc. § 637 (1895).
5
Tingle: Substituted Service on a Non-Resident Vendor of Montana Land
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1952
NOTES AND COMMENT
authority,' the court held that the suit was one in personam, the
object of which was to compel the defendant to execute a deed
to the land. It was admitted that had the action been one in
rem or quasi in rem constructive service would have sufficed,
the court quoting from Roller v. Holly,' a United States Supreme
Court decision construing a similar statute:
"We cannot treat it [the statute] as wholly nuga-
tory, and, as it is impossible to say it contemplates a
procedure in one class of cases and not in another, we
think the only reasonable construction is to hold that it
applies to all cases where, under recognized principles
of law, suits may be instituted against non-resident de-
fendants. "
Of course, according to "recognized principles of law," a
suit for specific performance may be predicated on constructive
service, assuming the necessary statutory authority.' Though
not referred to in the case, there was statutory authority" which
provided that if the defendant failed to obey a decree ordering
a conveyance, the sheriff could be directed to execute it on the
defendant's behalf. This statute, plus the one authorizing serv-
ice by publication generally, laid the legislative basis requisite
to the assumption of jurisdiction over this type of action.' The
defendant need not, as stated in an early Massachusetts decision"
quoted with approval in the principal case, be "eminently active
in the performance of any decree which may be made against
him." The defendant, under Montana statutes, may remain
completely torpid and apathetic, and still the court can enforce
the decree through its officer. There is no longer any reason for
denying a purchaser of land a remedy in his own courts based
on the proposition that the suit is one strictly in personam. If
the rule is followed, he may be denied any effective remedy due
to Montana's controlling jurisdiction over the land."
The second case to be considered is Gassert v. Strong" which
OSupra, note 7.
2'Close v. Wheaton; Spurr v. Scoville, supra, note 8; Dehart v. Dehart,
15 Ind. 167 (1860) ; McQuerry v. Gilliland, 89 Ky. 434, 12 S.W. 1037
(1890).
"176 U.S. 398, 20 S. Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520 (1900), holding that the statute
embraced within its terms an action to foreclose a vendor's lien on local
land.
"Supra, notes 7, 11, and 12.
"Montana Code of Civ. Proc. § 972 (1895) ; Now, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4504.
2'Supra, note 16.
'Spurr v. Scoville, supra, note 8.
"Wilson v. Thelan, 110 Mont. 305, 100 P. (2d) 923 (1940) ; Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 (1909) ; Duke v. Andler, (1932)
Can. S. C. 734.
"38 Mont. 18, 98 P. 497 (1908).
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was an action to impose a constructive trust' on corporation
stock certificates physically within the court's jurisdiction,
though the defendant was a non-resident served by publication.
The court held that jurisdiction was acquired by constructive
service, the proceeding being one quasi in rem because the "ob-
ject is to subject the shares of stock, which are within the juris-
diction of the court, to the claim of plaintiff." This case was
decided under the statute applied in the Dickert case.' The court
distinguished the cases on the ground that the earlier case was
an action "in personam.'"' It would seem no such distinction
can be drawn logically, in view of Montana's statute authorizing
enforcement of a decree for specific performance in rem. It
would be extremely unrealistic to say that the object of a suit
for specific performance against a non-resident is not to subject
the land involved to "the claim of plaintiff," but merely to en-
force personal action on defendant's part. It is obvious that no
personal decree rendered against a non-resident defendant, con-
structively served, would be valid.' What the plaintiff really
desires is that title to the land be put in him through the agency
'Actions to establish and enforce trusts were historically actions in per-
sonam whereby the conscience of the legal title holder was sought to be
reached. 2 PoMERY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 428, 429, 430 pp. 196-200
(5th ed. 1941) ; LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING p. 35 and n. 4.
(2d ed. 1883). What greater purpose is served in modification of the
traditional rule with respect to constructive trusts than would be served
by a change in that rule as regards specific performance actions?
'fBy the weight of authority stock certificates have sufficient situs where
physically located to sustain the jurisdiction of the courts there to ad-
judicate interests and rights in the stock, based on constructive service,
in an action against a non-resident. 42 Am. Jun., Process, § 88; See note,
87, A.L.R. 485. The concept of situs as applied to corporate stock is,
indeed, an amorphous one, fluctuating with the object of litigation. For
tax purposes the stock may have a situs in the state of incorporation,
where the stock is physically located, or in the state where the owner
is domiciled. For garnishment, actions to test ownership, and actions
to recover shares of stock, the situs varies according to the purpose of
the suit. 13 AM. Jur., Corporations, § 174. An action, based on con-
structive service, to impose a constructive trust on shares of stock
physically within the jurisdiction is a much weaker case, in the light of
the fundamental power of the court over property situated within its
jurisdiction, than an action to enforce a land contract, the land having
but one situs.8 Though amended in 1907 by Chapter 36 of the Law of 1907, the court
held that the process was served under the original statute.
OIs this not begging the question? As can be seen from the definitions
(supra, note 3) of in rem and in personam actions and the discussion
thereof in the text, the fundamental differences seem to lie in the modes
of service and the remedies available. To use "in personam" as a rea-
son for distinguishing the cases is to give a conclusion in lieu of a rea-
son.
tmSupra, note 7.
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of the sheriff. Even if the relief prayed for is purely in terms
demanding personal action by the defendant, it has been held
that relief in the form of a deed executed by the sheriff is with-
in the purview of the prayer for general relief."
The Montana code provision authorizing substituted service
was amended in 1907 by the following addition:'
"The provisions of this section shall apply to all ac-
tions and proceedings in which personal service of sum-
mons is not required to be made in order to obtain re-
lief, including every action or proceeding commenced
in any district court of this state to enforce any legal or
equitable lien upon, or claim to, or to remove any en-
cumbrance, or lien, or cloud, upon the title of real or
personal property within the state."
In State ex rel. Miller v. District Court" the supreme court
was called upon to decide the issue raised in the Dickert case,
counsel for the plaintiff insisting that the action had been
changed, by the amendment, to one in rem. The court, speaking
through Chief Justice Adair, refused to accede to counsel's argu-
ment and reasserted the holding of the former case:
"... in the absence of elements establishing a trust'
in favor of the plaintiff with respect to land in this
state, a suit for specific performance of a contract for
the sale thereof is a suit in personam which may be
brought only where the defendant resides, or may be
legally served with summons ... "
There was a strong dissenting opinion delivered by Mr. Jus-
tice Angstman, with which Mr. Justice Metcalf concurred, the
thesis of which was that the Montana statute on constructive
"Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, supra, note 13.
"'Ch. 36 § 1, LAWS OF MONTANA 1907; Now, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3013.
"120 Mont. 423, 186 P. (2d) 506 (1947).
'Apparently the "trust" element was injected into the rule because of
the case of Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52 (1875), wherein it was held
that entry into possession of land, subject to contract, by the purchaser
with the consent of the vendor, plus valuable improvements, gave
rise to an implied trust, thereby bringing the action for specific per-
formance within the Massachusetts constructive service statutes relat-
ing to actions against a person seized of an estate upon express or im-
plied trust who is not amenable to process.
Despite the loose language of the courts on this problem, the vendor
and purchaser of land sustain toward each other no trust relationship.
The vendor is not in a fiduciary relation to the purchaser, and the only
similarity between a trust and a contract to convey realty is that legal
title is in one party and equitable title in another. ScoTT ON TRuSTS
§ 13, pp. 109-111 (1939). The Massachusetts court is evidently cutting
in on the harsh rule as to land contracts by using this "trust" excep-
tion.
8
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service was broad enough to include an action for specific per-
formance of a land contract.
The majority of the court relies heavily on the case of Mu-
nicipaZ Inv. Co. v. Gardinere which held an action for specific
performance of a land contract was not within a Federal statute"
which included only the latter part of the Montana amendment
i.e., ". . . to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon, or claim to,
or to remove any encumbrance, or lien, or cloud, upon the title
of real or personal property within the district where such suit
is brought. .... " The court in this case said the action was not
one to enforce an "equitable . . . claim" to the land because no
decree was sought affecting the land, rather the plaintiff desired
relief in personam against the defendant. It is submitted that
this construction of the statute is unduly technical and perhaps
erroneous." The equity in land asserted by a purchaser in an
action for specific performance" is the very quintessence of an
"equitable ... claim to ... the title of real... property.... "
The Montana cases" cited in the majority opinion do nothing
more than assert the propositions that an action in personam
must be founded on personal service, and that when legislation
8862 F. 954 (1894).
8U.S. Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1039.
"The thesis of this paper is predicated, at least in part, on the proposition
that the specific performance suit falls within the actions enumerated
in 93-3013. No such restricted position is demanded either rationally,
grammatically, or authoritatively. The rule is generally laid down by
the cases that the word "including" introduces illustrative members of
a larger class and in no way operates as a limitation on previous gen-
eral language. This interpretation has been applied by the Montana
Supreme Court in divorce cases. See Syverud, Procedure: Substituted
Serice on Domiciliary by Notice Outside the State, 2 Mont. L. Rev.
Notes 10 and 11, p. 118 (1941).
&Under the doctrine of equitable conversion (which springs from the
equity maxim: Equity regards and treats that as done which in good
conscience ought to be done) the purchaser under a land contract is
treated in equity as the owner of the land. The equitable interest may
be conveyed or encumbered; it may be devised by will; it descends to
the purchaser's heirs on his death intestate; in the United States gen-
erally, and in Montana (R.C.M. 1947, § 22-101) the purchaser's wife has
dower in the estate; and the purchaser bears the risk of loss, generally,
in the absence of a contrary agreement. 2 PoMxsoy's EQurrY Juis-
PRUDENCE § 368 pp. 21-25 (5th ed. 1941).
Furthermore, a contract for the sale of land is a "conveyance" of an
"estate or interest" in realty within the meaning of the Montana re-
cording statute. R.C.M. 1947, § 73-202, and see, R.C.M. 1947, § 73-203.
Piccolo et al. v. Tauaka et al., 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890 (1927).
"Burke v. Interstate Savings & Loan Ass'n., 25 Mont. 315, 64 P. 879
(1901) ; Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont. 463, 171 P. 272 (1918) ; Hinderager
v. MacGinniss, 61 Mont. 312, 202 P. 200 (1921) ; Holt v. Sather, 81
Mont. 442, 264 P. 108 (1927) ; Winnett Times Pub. Co. v. Berg, 82 Mont.
141, 265 P. 710 (1928).
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authorizes constructive service, strict interpretation and observ-
ance of statutory requirements is demanded. Adherence to these
principles does not militate against the position taken in the dis-
senting opinion.
The majority opinion recognizes the possibility of legislation
which would change the action to one in rem, but insists that the
cases cited to bolster the contra position were based on statutes,
the language of which was substantially different than that in
the Montana code. The language employed in most of the
statutes construed in the cases" was of substantially the same
tenor as the Montana provision, but, as was noted in the dissent,
"the outstanding difference between our statute and those in-
volved in the above cited cases is that ours is broader than any
of the others." The Montana statute alone provides: "The pro-
visions of this section shall apply to all actions and proceedings
in which personal service of summons is not required to be made
in order to obtain relief. .. ." It would be hard to conceive of
language which evidenced a stronger or clearer legislative intent
to extend the terms of Section 93-3013 to any and all actions
in which, under the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court
of the United States," constructive service is permissible. An
action for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance
of local land is such an action and is embraced within the scope
of 93-3013.
In conclusion, it may be stated compendiously that the re-
sult reached the Miller case, in light of the statutory change in
1907, is to be regretted. The holding not only works a severe
hardship on purchasers of Montana land owned by non-residents,
but also is the product of an unduly strained and technical con-
struction of the pertinent legislation, inconsistent with the mani-
fested legislative intent.'
JAMES O'MALLEY TINGLE.
"Supra, note 14. Typical of the statutes discussed.
"Supra, notes 7 and 12.
'The case of McAlpin v. Smith, 123 Mont. 391, 213 P. (2d) 602 (1950),
further illustrates plaintiff's hapless state. Plaintiff instituted an
action for specific performance of a contract concerning Montana land
against non-residents, served by publication. This, of course, proved
fruitless, and a quiet title action was brought. The court held that
plaintiff failed to prove his title, and the action was dismissed.
10
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